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(Continued from overleaf)
As for the business empire, detailed analysis revealed that the businesses, listed by Kleinworts for the OFT were not quite what they seemed.
- These "leading shipowners in the liner trade" owned just two roll-on, roll-off ferries and no cruise liners.
- Genavco, the Fayeds' principal British trading company at the time of the take-over, was a modest affair; it lost money in three of the five years to 1985; and in the other two together, total profits were less than £500,000.
- Examination of the title deeds relating to 75 Rockefeller Plaza revealed that in 1985 the Fayed brothers did not own the freehold. The brothers had a lease which was heavily mortgaged; and the tenants, Warner Communications, had an option to buy the lease at any time between 1989 and 1991.
- The Paris Ritz had been consistently unprofitable since acquisition.
- Investigations in Haiti -- where Mohamed Fayed for a time had dealings with the unsavoury despot "Papa Doc" Duvallier -- and in Italy, Switzerland, the US and the Middle East revealed that the brothers were not a major international force in any of the areas mentioned.
By most standards, the Fayeds were wealthy businessmen. But these businesses could not possibly have generated the funds needed to buy House of Fraser -- much less the claimed net worth of several billion dollars. Nor, clearly, could inheritance. So where did the Fayeds raise the wind? From the Sultan of Brunei, says Lonrho; not so, says the Sultan, who was once advised by Mohamed Fayed.
The formal documents stated that the bid was being financed from "the existing resources and normal trading facilities" of the Fayed family. But the normal facilities of the businesses in Kleinwort's submission to the OFT could scarcely have been adequate to bridge the gap. The question, then, is whether substantial additional borrowings were raised to finance the acquisition.
Documents at Companies House relating to House of Fraser Holdings, the shell company through which the bid was launched, appear to lend support to this: both Swiss Bank Corporation and Samuel Montagu turn up there as lenders. By 1987 the company had no less than £553m of borrowings. Meantime the stores subsidiary's £45m profit fell short of more than £50m of interest payable on the holding company's debt. So the ability of the Fayeds' other businesses to plug that income deficit now has an important bearing on the future fortunes of the stores group.
Yet the brothers' solicitors, Herbert Smith, have said in response to the Channel 4 programme that these borrowings were not financing the original acquisition, but resulted solely from a refinancing of funds previously provided by the Fayeds; the stores group's profits were then offset against the shell company's interest liabilities to reduce tax. So the mystery deepens. All that can be said with certainty is that had more details of the Fayeds' business and financing arrangements been revealed from Liechtenstein in 1985, the government would have had pause for thought. Especially in a climate that was to lead to the referral of Elders IXL's subsequent bid for Allied-Lyons because of heavy borrowings.
Does it really matter if the Fayeds made false and misleading statements in a bid for a company that was scarcely vital to the British economy? Or that Kleinworts and John MacArthur unwittingly propagated them? In the public interest, control of leading companies clearly cannot be allowed to change on the basis of false information. And with the internationalisation of capital markets and Britain's openness to foreign bidders, signs of regulatory weakness would constitute an open invitation to some very unsavoury characters.
The failure was arguably more one of people and institutions than of the system itself. Prime responsibility for the statements, which violated general principles of the Takeover Code, lies with the Fayeds. Yet Kleinwort Benson can hardly escape all criticism, especially in view of the reliance placed on its pronouncements by all involved. Government, PR men, and press, meantime, were less than vigilant in the affair.
Any criticism from the DTI inspectors will pose a dilemma for Trade Secretary Lord Young. Is it worth referring the bid to the Monopolies Commission, so opening up the possibility of a recommendation that the Fayeds be forced to divest? The shareholders, after all, emerged with a good price. The underlying company is profitable, even if its net borrowings have increased more than threefold since the bid to £348m and several stores have been disposed of. Apart from the government, which has been made to look foolish, the main aggrieved party is Lonrho; but since Lonrho sold its stake voluntarily to the Fayeds, it commands little sympathy.
There is no easy answer. But first, the inspectors must have their say.
Channel 4's programme "The Harrods Sale" was made by Box Productions and presented by John Plender.
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